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M uch	 money,	 time	 and	 effort	 have	 been	 in-vested	in	conventional	mine-risk	education.	UNICEF	defines	mine-risk	education	as	“a	
process	that	promotes	the	adoption	of	safer	behaviors	by	
at-risk	groups	and	links	affected	communities	and	other	
mine-action	components.”1	The	problem	is	this	“process”	
doesn’t	always	work	as	well	as	we	hope.	The	Cambodian	
Mine/UXO	Victim	Information	System	reports	that	in	
August	2006,	35	new	landmine/UXO	victims	were	re-
corded	in	Cambodia.2	Out	of	these	35	casualties	only	one	
victim	had	not	previously	received	MRE.	2	This	data	is	
consistent	with	previous	reports	as	well.3	That	means	97	
percent	of	victims	had	received	some	sort	of	conventional	
MRE	prior	 to	 being	 killed	 or	 injured	by	 landmines	 or	
unexploded	munitions.	If	97	percent	of	drivers	involved	
in	 crashes	had	 recently	 completed	drivers’	 training,	we	
might	begin	to	question	the	overall	effectiveness	of	that	
training.	 In	Southeast	Asia,	despite	 some	reductions	 in	
casualties	overall,	 the	 fastest	growing	at-risk	groups	are	
those	involved	in	scrap-metal	collection.
Mine-risk Education and the Amateur 
Scrap-metal Hunter
by	Allan	R.	Vosburgh	[	Golden	West	Humanitarian	
Foundation	]
In many countries where landmines 
and unexploded ordnance threaten 
populations, people ignore warnings 
about these hazardous explosives 
to collect explosive remnants of war 
for the valuable scrap metal they 
contain. The author discusses a pro-
gram proposed by the Golden West 
Humanitarian Foundation to manage 
this dangerous practice. 
These	numbers	certainly	do	not	mean	we	should	abandon	efforts	to	educate	the	
population	about	avoiding	death	and	injury	from	mines	and	UXO.	On	the	contrary,	
what	it	may	suggest	is	new	ideas	are	needed	to	address	specific	types	of	hazards	and	
categories	of	potential	victims,	particularly	amateur	scrap-metal	collectors.	
According	 to	 reports	 by	 the	 Cambodian	 Mine/UXO	 Victim	 Information	
System,	353	people	were	injured	or	killed	between	January	and	August	2006	in	
Cambodia.2	Of	 these	 casualties,	 62	 percent	were	men,	 8	 percent	were	women,	
and	30	percent	were	children	under	18	years	of	age.2	Fifty-eight	percent	of	 the	
casualties	were	people	injured	or	killed	by	UXO	and	42	percent	by	landmines.2	
These	numbers	indicate	a	disturbing	trend	in	which	casualties	are	increasing	de-
spite	greater	efforts	to	eliminate	threats.	This	trend	also	exists	in	Vietnam,	Laos	
and	other	areas.	We	think	it	points	to	an	underlying	problem—collecting	scrap	
metal	is	the	new	growth	industry	in	these	countries.
The	Golden	West	Humanitarian	Foundation	has	taken	a	pragmatic	aproach	to	
MRE,	generalizing	it	to	become	ERW	threat-indicators	education.4	We	strongly	
support	education	but	believe	the	best	way	to	prevent	deaths	and	injuries	is	to	use	
education	as	one	element	in	a	program	designed	to	eliminate	the	ERW	threats	as	
quickly	as	possible.	
Sneaky Devices 
In	 central	Vietnam	and	Laos,	many	deaths	or	 injuries	 are	 caused	 in	partic-
ular	 by	 unexploded	 cluster	 submunitions	 or	 40-mm	 grenades.	 These	 unstable,	
long-lasting	munitions	are	a	widespread	hazard,	frequently	concealed	by	tall	grass	
or	shallow	dirt.	Not	only	are	they	hit	by	farmers’	hoes	or	plows,	exploded	when	
fires	 are	 built	 on	 top	of	 them	 and	 irresistable	 to	 children,	 but	 these	 dangerous	
munitions	are	often	the	very	devices	scrap-metal	collectors	 intentionally	gather,	
disarm	and	sell.
In	 addition,	 unexploded	mortar	 projectiles	 can	 be	 a	 threat.	Mortar	 projec-
tiles	come	in	a	huge	variety	of	sizes	and	contain	a	number	of	different	fillers.	In	
Vietnam,	mortars	 can	 be	 found	 from	 60-mm	 to	 160-mm.	 Fillers	may	 include	
different	types	of	high	explosives,	white	phosphorus	and	other	smokes	and	flares.	
Fuzes	may	incorporate	proximity	devices,	or	use	impact,	powder-train	or	timing	
mechanisms	for	initiation.	Unfortunately,	once	the	paint	and	markings	are	weath-
ered	away,	it	is	often	very	difficult	to	positively	identify	the	type	of	filler	and,	there-
fore,	the	explosive	threat.	Mortars	can	be	small,	easy	to	move	and	less	intimidating	
than	artillery	projectiles	and	bombs.	They	can	also	be	deadly.
These	 munitions,	 submunitions	 and	
grenades	share	a	single	deceptive	character-
istic	 that	can	 lull	victims	 into	a	 false	 sense	
of	security:	inconsistency.	They	often	fail	to	
fully	arm	and	detonate	due	to	a	critical	and	
permanent	 mechanical	 fault	 in	 their	 arm-
ing	or	firing	mechanism.	However,	at	other	
times,	 the	 fault	may	be	minimal,	 allowing	
arming	but	preventing	firing.	In	these	cases,	
items	of	UXO	may	require	only	heat,	shock	
or	 friction	 to	 detonate—sometimes	 years	
later.	 Firing	 mechanisms	 are	 complex	 and	
designed	 to	 accept	 input	 from	 almost	 any	
direction.	 Because	 these	 munitions	 are	 so	
often	 damaged	 and	 prevented	 from	 func-
tioning,	 people	 come	 to	 believe	 they	 are	
harmless.	When	a	civilian	picks	one	up	and	
it	doesn’t	kill	him	or	her,	that	person	is	more	
likely	to	pick	up	the	next	one.	However,	the	
next	munition	or	the	one	after	that	may	det-
onate	without	warning,	killing	or	 seriously	
injuring	both	 the	person	who	picked	 it	up	
and	anyone	nearby.
Challenges to Conventional Mine-risk 
Education Practices
So	 what	 might	 the	 problem	 be?	 Why	
would	 anyone	 who	 has	 received	 training	
pointing	 out	 the	 dangers	 of	 interacting	
with	munitions	intentionally	do	it	anyway?	
Is	there	something	about	the	training	that	
makes	 it	 ineffective?	 Are	 there	 other	 fac-
tors	 at	work	 that	 overcome	 the	warnings?	
Are	 there	ways	 to	enhance	the	training	to	
make	 it	 more	 effective?	 The	 answers	 to	
these	questions	 are	 complex	 and	 there	 are	
no	easy	solutions.5
Most	programs	engaged	in	MRE	recog-
nize	 that	 people	 are	 frequently	 injured	 by	
UXO	 they	knew was there.	 As	 the	 num-
bers	 from	Cambodia	 show,	 successful	com-
pletion	of	an	MRE	program	is	no	assurance	
one	will	not	fall	victim	to	a	mine	or	item	of	
UXO.	Many	 victims	 are	 children	who	play	
with	 munitions	 or	 dangerous	 munitions	
components	(e.g.,	fuzes)	near	their	homes	or	
schools.	 Farmers	 or	woodcutters	 often	 acci-
dentally	 trigger	 explosions	 in	 the	 process	 of	
their	daily	work,	but	those	most	resistant	to	
behavioral	change	are	scrap-metal	collectors.	
Scrap-metal	 trading	has	become	a	well-
entrenched	 part	 of	 many	 local	 economies	
throughout	 Southeast	 Asia.	 Scrap-metal	
collectors	 engage	 in	 their	 dangerous	 trade	
for	 a	 variety	 of	 reasons,	 but	most	 say	 they	
simply	 need	 the	money	 they	 earn	 from	 its	
sale.	 Studies	 have	 shown	 people	 are	 gener-
ally	well-aware	of	the	dangers	they	face,	but	
feel	compelled	to	continue	the	dangerous	ac-
tivity	due	to	the	pressures	of	poverty.6	They	
often	report	feeling	they	have	no	choice.
The Solution
The	 apparent	 failure	 of	 various	 kinds	
of	 education	 to	 change	 this	 risky	 behavior	
signals	a	need	for	a	change	in	our	MRE	ap-
proach.	Perhaps	instead	of	spending	all	our	
energies	 trying	 to	 eliminate	 risky	behavior,	
we	 should	 be	 trying	 to	 find	 new	 ways	 to	
make	this	inevitable	behavior	safer.	This	pro-
posed	approach	will	undoubtedly	find	many	
opponents	who	feel	we	are	simply	encourag-
ing	more	risky	behavior;	however,	at	Golden	
West	we	 believe	 in	 taking	 a	 pragmatic	 ap-
proach	 to	behavior	 that	we	 think	will	 con-
tinue	with	or	without	our	intervention.
Golden	 West	 believes	 we	 can	 success-
fully	combine	our	experience	with	Explosive	
Remnants	 of	War	 Indicators	 Programs	 and	
our	 popular	 Explosive	 Harvesting	 System	
into	 a	 concept	 that	 addresses	 the	 growing	
number	 of	 scrap-metal-related	 casualties.	
Educating	people	and	providing	a	more	ro-
bust	 explosive	 ordnance	 disposal	 response	
to	 ERW	 reports	 will	 hopefully	 encourage	
the	 public	 to	 make	 more	 reports.	 Rather	
than	 spend	 resources	 trying	 to	 discourage	
behavior	we	know	is	happening,	why	not	try	
a	new	approach	that	may	make	the	process	a	
little	safer?	
Furthermore,	might	we	do	even	more	in	
an	 effort	 to	 reduce	 casualties	 and	 actually	
establish	 training	 and	 procedures	 facilitat-
ing	safer	scrap	collection?	If	there	was	a	way	
to	use	training	to	eliminate	threats	from	the	
most	dangerous	 items	 (primarily	 submuni-
tions,	grenades	and	mortars),	there	might	be	
ways	to	develop	an	exchange	system	for	the	
less	hazardous	ones.	
A New Response to Scrap-
metal Collection
In	 this	 concept,	 expanded	 explosive	
ordnance-disposal	 teams	 respond	 to	 UXO	
reports	 from	 civilians,	 assess	 the	 threat	 and	
return	 harmless	 items	 to	 be	 sold	 as	 scrap.	
For	questionable	items	that	cannot	be	safely	
turned	over,	a	fee	equal	to	the	weight	of	the	
useable	metal	would	be	paid	by	the	team	to	
the	finder.	These	items	would	be	transported	
to	 a	 small	 explosives-processing	 facility	 for	
treatment	(when	feasible)	and	the	metal	parts	
sold	to	reimburse	the	program.	UXO	deemed	
too	 dangerous	 for	 movement	 would	 be	 de-
stroyed	in	place	by	the	safest	method	possible.	
Recovered	items	deemed	unsuitable,	too	dan-
gerous	for	processing	or	lost	during	treatment	
would	be	considered	a	program	cost.	
A	blow-in-place	procedure	for	small	items	
(like	 individual	 submunitions	 or	 grenades)	
can	use	field-expedient7	damage-mitigation	
methods	 such	 as	 Mr.	 BIP.8	 Larger	 items	
may	be	controlled	by	ditching,	sandbags	or	
water.	 Whenever	 possible,	 items	 will	 be	
moved	 away	 from	 occupied	 areas	 prior	 to	
any	procedures	being	initiated.	
Under	 this	 concept	 only	 simple	 render-
safe	procedures	will	be	applied;	no	complex	
procedures	will	be	attempted	and	absolutely	
no	 procedures	 that	 include	 any	 degree	 of	
risk	 to	 operators	will	 be	 conducted.	 Safety	
will	 never	 be	 compromised	 in	 the	 interest	
of	scrap	metal.	Only	items	the	senior	EOD	
Team	 Leader	 considers	 safe	 to	 transport	
will	be	moved	off	the	site.	These	items	will	
then	 be	 independently	 inspected	 by	 EOD	
personnel	 prior	 to	 being	 brought	 into	 any	
safe	holding	area.
Reimbursements	 will	 be	 established	 as	
a	 reward	 system	 for	 reporting	 and	 leaving	
items	undisturbed,	and	as	a	 safe	means	 for	
* As determined by EOD only.
Status* Action Reimbursement Disposition
No hazard: contains no explosive None None Turn over to finder for sale
Extreme hazard: fuzed and contains  
explosive (do not move)
Blow in place or move remotely and 
BIP
Market price Destroy on site
Dangerous: fuzed and contains high  
explosive (transportation hazard)
Attempt render-safe procedures 
(when feasible)
Market price Treatment facility or BIP
Dangerous: no fuze and contains high 
explosive (no transportation hazard)
Transport to safe holding area Market price Treatment facility
Table	1:	Examples	of	options	for	different	threats.	
1
Vosburgh: Mine-risk Education and the Amateur Scrap-metal Hunter
Published by JMU Scholarly Commons, 2006
32 |	focus	| journal of mine action | winter 2006 | 10.2 10.2 | winter 2006 | journal of mine action |	focus	| 33  
people	to	obtain	needed	money	in	exchange	for	suspect	
items.	There	will	no	longer	be	an	excuse	that	they	had	
no	choice	because	we	are	providing	a	choice.	People	do	
not	need	to	endanger	their	families,	neighbors	or	them-
selves	to	make	a	little	extra	money.	
The	senior	EOD	Team	Leader	will	be	provided	with	
small	amounts	of	cash	to	do	on-the-spot	reimbursements	
for	dangerous	items	removed	by	the	team.	Scrap	result-
ing	from	processing	of	munitions	will	be	sold	and	any	
profits	reinvested	in	the	program.	Any	recovered	explo-
sives	will	be	used	to	support	disposal	of	other	unusable	
munitions.	There	will	be	a	strict	system	of	accounting	
for	funds.	The	physical	inventory	of	munitions	in	the	
program’s	 safe	 holding	 area	 validates	 the	 expenditure	
of	funds.	Despite	the	closed-loop	character	of	the	con-
cept,	there	is	no	expectation	that	this	will	be	a	balanced	
system;	 that	 is,	 the	 investments	 will	 never	 equal	 the	
profits	from	sale	of	metal.	
A	munitions-treatment	facility	should	be	located	in	a	
remote	area	with	plenty	of	buffer	zone	in	all	directions.	
Barricades	will	be	field-expedient:	 locally	produced	and	
using	 rubber	 tires	 filled	 with	 sand	 or	 sand-filled	 con-
crete	pipes;	no	permanent	 facilities	will	be	constructed.	
Disposal	tools	will	be	remotely	operated	and	procedures	
monitored	 via	 closed-circuit	 TV.	With	 some	modifica-
tion,	many	of	the	tools	and	procedures	used	by	the	Golden	
West	Explosives	Harvesting	System	may	be	 appropriate	
for	use	in	the	demilitarization	facility.	When	fuzes	can-
not	be	safely	removed,	projectiles	can	be	cut	behind	the	
booster	or	fuze	well.	Once	the	forward	part	of	the	projectile	is	removed,	the	explosive	
can	be	steamed	out	and	the	forward,	fuzed	portion	burned	in	a	portable	demilitar-
ization	 furnace.	Once	 the	explosive	charge	 is	 removed,	 the	metal	 is	added	to	 the	
scrap	to	be	sold.	No	fuzes	containing	primary	explosives	will	be	held	and	all	will	be	
treated	with	heat	or	destroyed	by	detonation.	
The	key	 to	 this	program	will	 be	well-trained,	 competent	EOD	and	demili-
tarization	personnel.	They	must	be	willing	to	submit	to	a	stringent	training	and	
quality-assurance/quality-control	program	and	concentrate	on	safety	at	all	times.	
All	the	skills	needed	to	make	an	EOD	team	effective	can	be	taught	or	reinforced	
by	this	program.	Large	areas	of	land	can	be	cleared	of	the	most	dangerous	items	
in	fairly	short	order	by	these	teams.	While	the	teams	will	do	no	subsurface	clear-
ance	past	 shallow-buried	bomblets	or	projectiles,	 the	 surface	 clearance	will	pay	
big	dividends.	
Conclusion
Despite	 repeated	warnings	 and	dedicated	MRE	programs,	 casualties	 from	
scrap-metal	 collection	 continue	 to	 increase.	 It	 seems	 warnings	 aren’t	 enough	
and	high-risk	behaviors	like	collecting	scrap	metal	must	be	addressed	by	either	
technical	 or	 economic	 solutions.	This	 proposed	 program	 combines	 these	 two	
elements	and	helps	address	root	economic	issues	through	the	application	of	new	
technologies	and	incentives.	The	concept	includes	provisions	for	assisting	scrap	
dealers	who	 currently	 traffic	 in	 dangerous	munitions.	The	program	may	 also	
help	eliminate	the	illegal	collection	and	use	of	explosives	for	fishing	or	other	il-
licit	purposes.	It	certainly	is	not	a	total	solution,	but	it	may	begin	to	reverse	the	
climbing	 rates	of	 injuries	 and	deaths	 resulting	 from	 the	 scrap-metal	business.	
Costs	of	this	program	could	easily	be	offset	by	real	reductions	in	the	fiscal	and	
societal	costs	resulting	from	scrap-collection-related	deaths	and	injuries.	Golden	
West	will	develop	and	implement	this	program	when	funding	is	secured.	
See Endnotes, page 110
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Finding More than Honey with Bees
Buried within the US$468 billion appropriations bill for the 
U.S. Department of Defense’s fiscal 2007 budget is $5 million 
for a new military tracking system—honey bees. The project 
would train honey bees for a variety of military and commercial 
uses, including finding landmines and other buried explosives.
Researchers at the University of Montana and Montana State 
University claim the bees can be monitored via a laser-tracking 
system. With further development, the bees may be able to detect 
more than just landmines and buried explosives—researchers be-
lieve the bees may also be capable of finding methamphetamine 
labs, dead bodies and other hard-to-detect items. 
Still, the primary focus of the honey-bee experimentation is on 
the discovery of explosives because bees are very attuned to 
the scent of TNT and similar material. Recognizing the acute 
sensitivity of bees’ antennae to different molecular compounds, 
scientists have studied the bees’ reaction to the scent of food 
and, through a Pavlovian technique, trained the bees to react 
positively toward the scent of dangerous materials. Funding for 
honey-bee programs is difficult to secure, and the technology 
still is not in a marketable form.
A fter	34	days	of	fighting	between	Israel	and	the	Hezbollah	militia	in	southern	Lebanon,	the	United	Nations	Security	Council	 adopted	 Resolution	 17011	 on	 August	 11,	 2006,	
which	 was	 aimed	 at	 ending	 hostilities,	 and	 a	 ceasefire	 entered	
into	force	August	14.	Despite	only	a	month	of	fighting,	the	con-
flict	greatly	disrupted	 the	normal	 lives	of	many	Lebanese	due	 to	
the	 damage	 to	 their	 homes	 and	 fields,	 and	 the	 remaining	 unex-
ploded	 ordnance—mainly	 cluster	 submu-
nitions—that	 littered	 the	 ground.	 The	
conflict	 killed	 over	 1,500	 people,	 many	
of	 whom	 were	 Lebanese	 civilians,	 and	 dis-
placed	approximately	900,000	Lebanese	and	
300,000	Israelis.2
The Victims
Many	of	 the	 victims	of	 this	 conflict	were	
civilians	 in	 Lebanon	 and	 Israel.	 As	 artillery	
and	 missiles	 were	 fired	 by	 both	 Hezbollah	
and	 Israel,	 approximately	 one-quarter	 of	 the	
Israelis	killed	by	Hezbollah	and	 the	majority	
of	the	Lebanese	killed	by	Israeli	forces	are	re-
ported	to	have	been	civilians.3	
Little	information	is	available	on	UXO	in	
Israel,	but	it	is	clear	that	the	estimated	1,800	
cluster	 bombs	 (containing	 over	 1.2	 million	
cluster	 bomblets)	 fired	 into	 Lebanon	 have	
devastated	 the	 local	 infrastructure.4	 Along	
with	 houses	 and	 fields	 destroyed,	 hospitals,	
schools,	 bridges,	 roads,	 factories,	 airports	
and	main	seaports	were	also	demolished.	Particularly	affected	areas	
were	southern	Lebanon,	Beirut	and	the	Bekaa	Valley.	The	northern	
part	of	Israel	was	most	affected	by	Hezbollah	attacks,	which	some-
times	consisted	of	150	rockets	fired	per	day.5
by	Katie	FitzGerald	[	Mine	Action	Information	Center	]
The recent conflict between Hezbollah and 
Israel resulted in many civilian victims 
and though the fighting has ended, 
the problems are nowhere near over for 
the civilians of Lebanon whose country 
is littered with cluster bomblets. This article 
explains the effects of the conflict on Lebanese civilians and describes how organizations are 
trying to eradicate the cluster-submunitions problem and provide aid to affected civilians. 
It	 has	 been	 reported	 Israel	 used	 cluster	munitions	 primarily	 de-
livered	by	artillery	projectiles,	 followed	by	Multiple	Launch	Rocket	
Systems	and	a	lesser	number	of	aerial	cluster	bombs.6	MLRS	in	par-
ticular	are	believed	by	many	to	be	highly	inaccurate.7	They	are	capable	
of	firing	a	high	volume	of	mostly	unguided	munitions.	The	rockets	
are	designed	to	burst	into	submunitions	at	a	planned	altitude	in	order	
to	blanket	the	enemy	army	and	personnel	on	the	ground	with	smaller	
explosive	rounds.	The	cluster	rounds	that	fail	to	
detonate—believed	by	the	United	Nations	to	be	
up	to	40	percent	for	some	munitions	fired	by	the	
Israeli	 Defense	 Forces	 in	 Lebanon—remain	 on	
the	ground	as	unexploded	submunitions.4	In	ad-
dition	to	the	cluster	submunitions,	an	estimated	
15,300	items	of	unexploded	ordnance—including	
air-dropped	bombs	of	500	to	2,000	pounds	(200	
to	900	kilograms),	 ground-	 and	naval-launched	
artillery	 rounds	 and	 air-delivered	 rockets—now	
litter	the	ground	in	southern	Lebanon.8
In	 an	 August	 30	 Reuters AlertNet	 article,	
Stephane	 Jaquenet,	 a	 United	 Nations	 High	
Commissioner	 for	 Refugees	 representative	 in	
Lebanon,	 said	 the	 organization’s	 top	 priority	
following	the	conflict	was	the	safe	return	of	the	
approximately	 one	 million	 Lebanese	 who	 fled	
the	month-long	war.11	Though	U.N.,	 Lebanese	
Army	and	nongovernmental	clearance	teams	im-
mediately	 started	removing	bomblets	and	other	
UXO,	 the	United	Nations	 and	 the	government	
of	 Lebanon	 have	 remained	 seriously	 concerned	
about	the	danger	residents	could	encounter.9	At	the	time	of	writing,	
the	United	Nations	Mine	Action	Coordination	Centre	of	Southern	
Lebanon	 assessed	 approximately	 85	 percent	 of	 southern	 Lebanon	
for	cluster-bomb	strikes,	and	 it	 is	estimated	 that	up	to	one	million	
The Aftermath of War
At	Al	Najda	Hospital	 in	Nabatiye,	southern	Lebanon,	Sobhi	Abbas,	top,	comforts	his	son	
Abbas	Abbas,	6	years	old,	who	was	injured	while	playing	with	a	cluster	bomb	in	Blida.	
PHOTO	COURTESY	OF	AP/MOHAMED	ZAATARI
GRAPHIC	COURTESY	OF	MAIC
2
Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction, Vol. 10, Iss. 2 [2006], Art. 10
https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal/vol10/iss2/10
